Introduction
Article 8 of the Treaty of the European Union (teu) sets out a duty for the Union to develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries based inter alia on the good neighbourliness principle, on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful cooperation.1 This is proposed to be achieved through the conclusion of 'specific agreements with the countries concerned' , possibly based on reciprocity of rights and obligations and/or joined activities.2 As evidenced by the various contributions in the present volume, many questions spring to mind when reading this new provision, regarding its raison d'être, its scope and its implications within the framework of the eu Treaties3 and the wider good neighbourliness principle deriving from international law.4 The role of Member States vis-à-vis the Union's neighbours has been outlined in this volume in various contexts, and the Member States' own commitment towards good neighbourliness within the eu.5 As rightly pointed out by another contributor to this volume in the context of the eu enlargement policy, '[d] epending upon the involvement of eu Member States and the risks for the importation of regional disputes into the eu's internal structures, the requirement of good neighbourliness is either translated into an obligation of conduct or an obligation of result' ,6 thereby revealing the changing or flexible nature of good neighbourliness. To determine the scope of good neighbourliness in the eu legal order, as enshrined in particular in Article 8 teu, and delimit any underlying commitment on the part of Member States, there is arguably a need to examine the 'micro' or individual relations a Member State maintains with its own neighbours. Such a micro-analysis of essentially bilateral relations should also permit reflections on the question of reciprocity and 'sharing of values' underlying good neighbourliness in a given relationship or set of relations.7 In this context, Cyprus is believed to be a unique case study, arguably standing both geographically and substantively at the 'edge' of good neighbourliness and as such, outlining the flexible nature of good neighbourliness through its atypical or 'outer' application in eu law.8 The micro-analysis in the case of Cyprus would focus on the 'de facto neighbouring' relations the Republic of Cyprus maintains with the part of its own sovereign territory under Turkish military control (internal relations) and, as a result, on the rather uneasy relations Cyprus maintains with Turkey as its neighbour, at the Union's door-step and also as a candidate country currently undergoing the accession negotiation process (external relations).
This chapter therefore proposes to deepen our understanding of the good neighbourliness principle in eu law, as enshrined in Article 8 teu and within of solidarity of the eu legal order,10 it would appear quite peculiar to argue that the eu alone is under an obligation to develop special relationships with neighbouring countries by virtue of Article 8 teu, while Member States are not required to do so within the framework of the eu Treaties.11 A question thus arises as to the extent and the conditions, if any, under which Member States are bound under Article 8 teu or otherwise, to develop good relations with their own neighbours and the implications of any such obligation within the framework of the eu Treaties.12
As a preliminary step, the term 'neighbour' within the framework of Article 8 teu would need to be considered and delimited in eu law, with respect not only to its external aspect but also arguably to its internal aspect and from a 10 The eu has been traditionally regarded as a regional grouping designed to promote security and stability. As It appears that the role of peace in the eu has changed to the extent that 'for long as democracy is maintained within the Union's membership the legal structures will operate effectively to remove any questions of territorial or economic tensions that was previously endemic in the European theatre'; see Williams, ibid 64. As a result, good neighbourliness in the eu appears to be based on the principles of sincere cooperation and solidarity rather than on territorial integrity as in public international law, thereby calling into question the salience of national borders; see Basheska (n 4) 46. 11
It is generally observed that the principle of national sovereignty in external affairs has been increasingly subject to the duty of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) teu, especially post Lisbon. For a review of the scope of the duty of sincere cooperation in eu external relations, see e.g. Eleftheria Neframi, 'The duty of loyalty: rethinking its scope through its application in the field of eu external relations' (2010) 47(2) cml Rev 323; see also Steven Blockmans and Ramses Wessel (eds), 'Principles and practices of eu external representation' , cleer Working Papers 2012/5. It is also recognised that Member State national interests are transcended through the principle of solidarity as embodied in various eu Treaty provisions. For a review of the principle of solidarity within the context of good neighbourliness in the eu, see Basheska (n 4) 65-67. 12
The general duty of loyalty arising under Article 4(3) teu and incumbent on the Member States constitutes 'an obligation to achieve a result to act in the Union interest […] fulfilled through specific-result or best-effort obligations expressed through the duty of loyal cooperation' , an expression of the general duty of loyalty. The nature of the 'specific obligation' will depend on the Union interest being promoted; All the above situations should entail prima facie the application of the good neighbourliness principle as enshrined in Article 8 teu, whether from an external perspective on eu neighbourhood relations by virtue of a rather 'asymmetrical' application of the principle,24 or from an internal perspective through the alleged application of the neighbourhood clause to inter-State relations, on an equal basis. These scenarios and nexus of relations have been adequately covered elsewhere in this volume. A more speculative venture is to examine from this lens the relationship a single Member State maintains with its own neighbours, especially when such neighbours are in fact a country/ territory located geographically (or otherwise) outside of the eu. If Article 8 teu appears to address expressly the eu's external relations with its neighbours and also the intra-eu neighbourhood relations, this provision does not seem a priori to be of immediate assistance when considering the individual relations a single Member State can maintain with a disputed territory or with a non-eu country. Given the fundamental nature of good neighbourliness in the eu,25 however, and notwithstanding the ramifications of the principles of 22 Even if the enp does not apply a policy of conditionality but rather one of 'joint ownership' of common values, the enp remains by definition a 'unilateral eu policy' and neighbouring countries are formally requested to adhere to and promote the Union's values as a result of their inclusion into the enp. This therefore also raises the question of the existence and scope of any obligation addressed to neighbouring countries under eu law; neighbourliness in eu law is concerned, as Turkey has proved to be a difficult partner, both in its bilateral relations with Cyprus within the framework of eu and international law, but also as a candidate country for eu membership.31 This contribution proposes to give an overview of the relations Cyprus maintains with these two rather 'unusual neighbours' , so as to examine to what extent these two instances of (internal/external) neighbouring relations may fall within the ambit of the neighbourhood clause and the legal implications of an alleged external application of good neighbourliness in this context. The atypical or external application of the principle of good neighbourliness in the context of Cyprus would entail an examination of the scope of such neighbouring relations rationae loci, materiae and personae, in a nexus of multi-dimensional relations.32 The primary interest for studying the external application of good neighbourliness from such a perspective lies in the consideration of the extent to which and how eu law applies to Cyprus' immediate 'neighbouring' relations. This is so, given that the application of eu law is suspended in the areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the government does not exercise effective control, even if these areas are located within the eu's territory,33 whereas Turkey is a candidate country and as such, currently falls outside the eu's territory. It is however inherent in the nature of the principle of good neighbourliness that this principle applies beyond the territory of the eu into the European neighbourhood, through conditionality policies in particular, hence the importance of studying its territorial, material and personal scope beyond the eu's territory in this specific context of alleged external application.
Beyond immediate considerations related to the territorial scope of good neighbourliness in the context of Cyprus, the specific substance of the principle will be analysed to identify the material scope of good neighbourliness in the present context and establish what, in this instance, may constitute good neighbouring relations. Moreover, it will be necessary to determine the personal scope of application of the principle to establish the individual and/ or unilateral responsibility Cyprus can derive towards its 'neighbours' , as well as any obligation that may arise towards the neighbouring territory/country itself. Of particular relevance to such considerations would be the question of the existence and scope of a minimum level or 'threshold' to be satisfied by all parties involved in neighbouring relations and of its legal origins. Within this framework, particular attention will be paid to establishing the legal nature of Cyprus's 'neighbouring' relations within the realm of eu law, supported by international law so as to establish some possible outer limits for good neighbourliness.
The External Application of the Good Neighbourliness Principle 'from within' the eu: The Case of the Occupied Areas in Cyprus
It is important to clarify from the outset that the case of the occupied areas in Cyprus is no 'ordinary' border or territory dispute involving a Member State and/or neighbouring countries/territories,34 since this territory belongs de jure to the Republic of Cyprus and remains therefore in essence an unresolved internal conflict.35 Notwithstanding the above, the external dimension of the de facto division of the island, including the roots of the conflict as well as its implications on the bilateral relations Cyprus maintains with Turkey will be addressed in the next and final part of this chapter. Suffice to note here in this respect that the case of Cyprus was also instrumental in the 'crystallisation' of good neighbourliness as a condition in the eu enlargement process.36 This chapter will however focus on the post-accession period and examine Cyprus's commitment as a Member State towards good neighbourliness, within the framework of the regulatory regime put in place in the eu legal order 'for the sole purpose of regulating the unprecedented situation in the eu of a Member State not exercising effective control over all its territory' .37 34 See (n 14). In Commons Hansard Written Answers (n 14), the division of the island of Cyprus was not listed among the border disputes involving current and/or prospective eu States but was 'added' at the end of these lists by the following mention: 'In addition, Cyprus joined the eu as a divided island on 1 May 2004. The eu acquis is suspended in northern Cyprus which Turkey recognises as the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"' . 35
Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 7-8, 325. 36
Ibid, 10-12, 20-21, 41-67; see also Basheska (n 4) 128-138. 37
Laulhé Shaelou (n 30) 300.
a Scope of Application of eu Law After eu accession, the situation in the occupied areas of Cyprus is deemed unique to the extent that it entails in principle the integral suspension of the acquis in a delimited territory within a Member State.38 The accession negotiations with Cyprus were conducted by the Republic of Cyprus on behalf of the whole island. This appears to indicate that eu law was applicable in principle to the areas beyond the control of the government but was suspended there temporarily, ab initio and a priori in toto.39 This was confirmed by the Court of Justice in Apostolides v Orams.40 Although this case does not actually involve the Republic of Cyprus itself but merely private litigants in a dispute over property located in the occupied areas, it is interesting to return to this judgment (and to the corresponding Advocate General's Opinion)41 to consider the scope of the suspension of eu law in the occupied areas and attempt to draw conclusions with respect to neighbourliness.
In The Brussels Regulation is an instrument of secondary legislation which promotes the fundamental freedoms and the mutual recognition of judgments throughout the eu.48 As such, any exception to it should be interpreted literally and strictly, even if contained in an instrument of primary legislation.49 It is unavoidable that Protocol 10 has a restrictive impact on the territorial scope of application of the Brussels Regulation within the occupied areas.50 However, this is impossible if the application of the Brussels Regulation is sought by a court situated in the government-controlled area of the Republic of Cyprus, even when the action relates to property located in the non-government controlled area.51 The Court rightly confirmed that the objective of Protocol 10 is literally the suspension of the acquis in the territory not under the effective control of the Republic and not in relation to that area.52 Anything to the contrary would have been found 'beyond what is absolutely necessary' under the given circumstances.53 In particular, there has never been an intention to exclude fully the application of provisions of eu law to the areas under the 'control' of the Turkish Cypriot community.54 In fact, Turkish Cypriots residing in these areas have been found on several occasions 'to derive individual rights under eu law' from the protection afforded by fundamental human rights under eu law and international law,55 and through the relative promotion of free movement through the Green Line.56 It follows from the above that the non-government controlled areas of the Republic of Cyprus can fall within the material and personal scope of eu law, at least when fundamental individual rights are at stake, and the scope of application of eu law in relation to these areas of Cyprus is variable.57
In the post-Lisbon era, with the eu's fundamental values codified in the Treaties,58 it would appear reasonable to assume that the values 'on which the Union is founded'59 would also apply in relation to and/or in the nongovernment controlled areas of the Republic of Cyprus, within the limits of the suspension of the acquis in these areas (as interpreted by the ecj) and of the eventual withdrawal of such a suspension pursuant to Protocol 10.60 This should without any doubt include good neighbourliness as a principle arising See Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 9, 31 (n 131), 50, 69-70, 199 (n 918). 67
Basheska writes: 'The need for respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus and for finding a legal solution to the problem was repeatedly stressed by actors in the international community. Such an approach is at the heart of the good neighbourliness principle based on un principles and maintained through the right and duties of states as established in international law'; see Basheska (n 4) 87-88 (footnote omitted). Turning to the question of duty in the eu legal order, it is important to note that the original role of Protocol 10 was to shield the Republic of Cyprus from liability in the areas beyond the effective control of its government, but only to the extent that this was rendered necessary by the de facto partition of the island. The rationale for this was the fact that the Republic could not guarantee the implementation and the enforcement of eu rules in the occupied areas, in breach of its commitments under the 2003 Treaty of Accession.74 As previously examined, however, with respect to the scope of application of eu law there 68 Ibid, 7, 11-13. 69
As and the failure thereto, this 'exclusion of liability clause' was to be interpreted strictly and could under no circumstances exempt the Republic of Cyprus fully from its obligations arising under eu law, and in particular from Article 4(3) teu.75 Looking at the secondary legislative instruments on the development of free movement across the Green Line and economic development in the occupied areas, they appear to outline 'the importance of coordination between the two sides in this special regime' .76 This interpretation of the legal regime established in Protocol 10 is arguably rooted in the case law of the ecj, the Anastasiou saga.
The Anastasiou saga involved free movement of goods claims brought by a Cypriot trader in the uk against the background of Cyprus's association with the eu and subsequently of Cyprus's accession to the eu. These claims were referred to the ecj by various English courts at different levels in the judicial system between 1992 and 2001.77 They related to the application of various provisions of the then ec law, including under the ec-Cyprus Association Agreement and related instruments, to the trade in the uk of goods originating from the areas not under the effective control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. In Anastasiou i,78 the Court ruled that 'the need for uniformity in Community policy and practice' , based on the 'principle of mutual reliance and cooperation between the competent authorities' , required that the relevant provisions of ec law be interpreted strictly and with exclusive reference to the competent authorities of the Republic of Cyprus when exports to the Community were involved.79 This ruling was confirmed in Anastasiou ii80 75 This is confirmed by the ninth recital of the Preamble to Protocol 10 and more precisely by Article 3(2) Protocol 10 with respect to the measures to be created under Article 3(1) Protocol to support the economic development in the occupied areas which 'shall not affect the application of the acquis under the conditions set out in the Accession (to the extent that the latter case was distinguished from the former) and was further developed in Anastasiou iii. 81 Anastasiou ii occurred in the context of the 'triangular trading relationship between the eu, Cyprus as a candidate country, and Turkey as an associated country' .82 As a result of the judgment of the Court in Anastasiou i, Turkish Cypriot goods were first exported to Turkey for certification before being 'reexported' to the eu 'outside of the scope of the eu-Cyprus Association and prima facie within the scope of the eu-Turkey Association Agreement' .83 The Court ruled that in the absence of proper certification, Turkish Cypriot goods had to be treated as goods originating from a third country subject to import duties if imported into the eu, including through Turkey. The principles established in Anastasiou i remained, however, largely untouched since the Court in Anastasiou ii focused mainly on the technical requirements arising from the non-privileged treatment of these goods (physically located outside of the eu),84 and of their importation into the eu.85
In a refinement of Anastasiou ii, the Court in Anastasiou iii looked this time at the issue of certification of goods in the internal market, both from the point of view of the origin of the goods and of the authorities competent to issue such certificates to introduce these goods into circulation in the eu. It ruled this time that 'the phytosanitary certificate required in order to bring those plants into the Community must […] be issued in their country of origin by, or under the supervision of, the competent authorities of that country' ,86 thereby closing the door to 'indirect trade' through Turkey and confirming the principle of the 'direct trade' of Turkish Cypriot goods in the eu through the government controlled area of the Republic of Cyprus.87 The Court referred to the 'exclusive competence' of the country of origin to issue the requested certificates and to the 'legitimacy' of the authorities legally authorised In the context of Cyprus, close cooperation appears as a strongalbeit not unlimited100 -unilateral commitment on the part of the Republic, whose prime objective is the avoidance of the legitimisation and/or recognition of the 'authorities' on the other side and includes -if and when necessaryelements of the ad hoc integration of the Turkish Cypriot community into the eu pending a political solution. The idea of 'progressive integration' can also be found in Article 8(1) teu, even if it should in principle fall short of full integration.101 In the case of Cyprus, the outcome ought to be different since the occupied areas are and remain a constituent part of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Cyprus and as such of the eu territory, and are committed to full eu integration, albeit deferred. Moreover, any instance of 'far reaching integration' through good neighbourliness should be based on reciprocity, which cannot really apply to Cyprus within its own sovereign territory. In this context, however, good neighbourliness can be said to reinforce the general commitment incumbent on Cyprus as a Member State to act in the spirit of close cooperation to benefit 'all Cypriot citizens and promote civil peace and reconciliation' .102 This appears to constitute a minimum threshold, even if it falls short of imposing any formal unilateral duty on Cyprus with respect to its own internal affairs. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the above analysis, there appears to be a 'higher' (specially framed and country-specific) threshold under eu law which would need to be satisfied on the part of Cyprus for actions falling within the material and/or personal scope of eu law (customs union, ccp and internal market in particular),103 as may be required at the eu level and/or derive from instruments of eu law. It generally transpires from the ecj's case law that the rules of the internal market are deemed applicable to intra-State and to interState relations.104 In the case of Cyprus, however, this is not a case of the straightforward application of the rules of the internal market in its territory, but a differentiated one due to the de facto division of the island. Accordingly, as a 'counterpart' to this higher commitment incumbent on Cyprus deriving from the application of the internal market rules in this special setting, with an unusual bearing on internal affairs, its willingness to consent to the various instruments of eu law pertaining to this special regime is sought at all times, within the framework of Protocol 10 as lex specialis.105 This appears to be the case even for instruments which would not normally require unanimity and/ or the express consent of the Republic of Cyprus, as they have an exclusive competence of the eu, such as the ccp or the Customs Union, legal basis.106 This special regime also arguably requires the general support of other Member States in accordance with the duty of loyal cooperation in the eu. In this context, therefore, it is believed that the above scenario involving a specific and unilateral commitment by a single Member State towards close cooperation is yet another manifestation of good neighbourliness within the eu. The next and final part of this chapter will examine another set of neighbouring relations, this time involving bilateral relations between two States and eu external relations though its enlargement policy.
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The Outer Application of the Principle of Good Neighbourliness 'from outside' the eu: The Case of Turkey
When a dispute involves two States, one of which is a Member State of the eu and the other a third country associated to the eu (a 'vertical dispute'),107 there can be a natural -albeit probably immature and certainly unequal and insufficient -tendency primarily to observe the conditions imposed on the 'outsider' in the dispute from the eu perspective, through the eu conditionality policy in particular.108 It has been argued that in vertical disputes, 'Member States can either act on their own behalf with respect to their bilateral disputes with candidate countries or on the behalf of the Union regarding 'eu-wide issues' .109 This would appear to give a lot of leeway to Member States, including during the enlargement process, with the inherent risk that 'instead of being used as an instrument to contribute to the settlement of international disputes 'in a spirit of good neighbourliness and bearing in mind the overall eu interests' , the conditionality principle in such cases serves the national interests and political considerations of individual Member States' .110 It is quite clear (by a majority of the Grand Chamber) that 'the passage of time since the delivery of the principal judgment on 10 May 2001 did not preclude it from examining the Cypriot Government's just satisfaction claims'; see <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ the echr and does not refer to or rely on the good neighbourliness principle as embodied in instruments of international law, there is no doubt that violations of several fundamental principles of the Declaration on Friendly Relations can be identified indirectly through this case law.116 This last remark also applies to the more detailed principles embodied in Article 2 of the un Charter, which have been found to form the main legal basis of good neighbourliness in international law.117 They include the duty to fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed in accordance with the Charter, the obligation to peacefully settle international disputes and the duty to refrain in international State relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.118 Turkey therefore also appears to be in breach of these more detailed principles and of the duties, positively or negatively framed, deriving therefrom, to the point that good neighbourliness between the two countries has been and is still regularly at stake.119 There has . After Cyprus's eu accession, the Court's analysis in the Apostolides case was limited to 'civil and commercial matters' within the scope of the Brussels Regulation (n 42): 'In the case in the main proceedings, the action is between individuals, and its object is to obtain damages for unlawfully taking possession of land, the delivery up of that land, its restoration to its original state and the cessation of any other unlawful intervention. That action is brought not against conduct or procedures which involve an exercise of public powers by one of the parties to the case, but against acts carried out by individuals' , para 45. There was in any case no mention of Turkey in the judgment, other than the fact that only Turkey recognises the so-called 'trnc' , para. 19; see also AG Kokott's Opinion in this case, para 45, as commented on in (n 73).
In eu law Turkey's obligations towards Cyprus are largely framed within the context of enlargement policy and therefore also directly involve the eu. From quite early on in the process, efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem would 'form part of the enhanced political dialogue' between the eu and Turkey123 and it was clear that the absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle on Turkey's road to the eu.124 The Negotiating Framework with Turkey125 lays down in Section 6 the guiding principles to measure the accession negotiations with Turkey, with reference in particular to the following requirements: (i) the Copenhagen criteria; (ii) 'Turkey's unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations and its undertaking to resolve any outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the [un] Charter, having recourse, if necessary, to the [icj]'; (iii) Turkey's continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, including through the 'normalisation of bilateral relations between Turkey and all eu Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus'; and (iv) 'the fulfilment of Turkey's obligations under the Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol extending the Agreement to all new eu Member States, in particular those pertaining to the eu-Turkey customs union, as well as the implementation of the Accession Partnership, as regularly revised' .126 Good neighbourliness therefore appears as an autonomous requirement for Turkey, separate from the Copenhagen criteria which Turkey was found to meet 'sufficiently' for accession negotiations to be opened,127 from bilateral relations between Turkey and all eu Member States, including Cyprus, and from the fulfilment of technical obligations by Turkey under the Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol. Apart from the rights and obligations deriving from the Association Agreement and other related legal instruments, the remainder of the requirements set out in Section 6 of the Negotiating Framework do not however seem to attract 'strict' liability for Turkey. This appears to be verified in Section 5 of the Negotiating Framework, which provides that only a 'serious and persistent breach in Turkey of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded'128 could trigger a suspension of the negotiations and the formulation of 'conditions' for their eventual resumption. Even if one considers that good neighbourliness ought to be included in the principles and values on which the Union is founded (as argued above),129 the express reference to a breach of such principles and values in Turkey rather than by Turkey would appear to exclude prima facie such breach in the context of Turkey's external relations, including a priori neighbouring relations with eu Member States.
Turkey's only specific obligations towards eu Member States would therefore appear to derive from the Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol, which Turkey ought to have extended to all new eu Member States as a result of the 2004 enlargement but failed to with regard to Cyprus.130 The eu addressed the legal implications of Turkey's attitude in a 'counter-declaration' adopted by the Council.131 This is a political declaration which nevertheless included a 'revision clause' , whereby the Council reiterated that Turkey's failure to implement its obligations in full would affect the 'overall progress in the negotiations' .132 As a result, the requirement regarding the normalisation of Turkey's bilateral relations with Cyprus was expressly referred to for the first time in the legally binding Accession Partnership.133 Almost ten years later, however, Turkey has still not complied in full with its obligations of 'non-discriminatory Lessons Learnt The absence of 'normal' bilateral relations between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus over the years has meant that neighbourly relations between these two countries are not based on reciprocity and are addressed primarily in the context of eu-Turkey relations (and not as a 'vertical dispute'). Even if the nonrecognition by Turkey of the Republic of Cyprus did not prevent the start of the accession negotiations as it was not a pre-condition to their commencement,138 it has become increasingly important in the context of the accession negotiations, to the point that it provoked their 're-framing' .139 It also provided eu Member States, including Cyprus, with an added opportunity to use their right to hold up Turkey's progress towards accession during the benchmarking process included in the accession negotiations.140 This last remark raises the question of whether, in view of Article 4(3) teu and/or in the spirit of 8(1) teu, Cyprus should unilaterally block the provisional opening or closing of negotiation chapters, as it has already done with respect to the opening of six other chapters.141 Arguably, the right to delay a candidate country's like Turkey's accession process is a collective prerogative of the Member States, the individual use of which could appear prima facie contrary to the spirit of good neighbourliness promoted by Article 8(1) teu (and expressly referred to in the Negotiating Framework for Turkey). While the unanimity requirement provides the opportunity for a single Member State to disapprove of benchmarks and/or of their evaluation (by exercising its 'veto'), it is reasonable to expect that the grounds for such disapproval should be 'related to compliance with accession criteria' .142 For Cyprus, the lack of reciprocity in neighbouring relations with Turkey has proved to have a direct impact on Turkey's fulfilment of its legal obligations under the Association Agreement and could as such provide a legitimate opportunity to exercise this right individually.
This last remark appears to raise the ultimate question of the future prospects of the eu-Turkey relations and in particular, of the impact of such relations in the broad framework of the eu Treaties, with reference in particular to the values of the Union and to the principle of effectiveness of eu law. Beyond the discussions related to the lack of progress of the accession negotiations and to the future of Turkey within the eu,143 the suitability of Article 49 teu as the legal basis for the eu-Turkey relations has been questioned variously and in different quarters.144 The hypothetical or actual advantage of using Article 8(2) teu to 'open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand' and to the Union's absorption capacity; see Section 2 of the Negotiating Framework; ibid 203-205. 144 Hillion (n 110) criticised the way Member States have 'tempered' the fundamentals of integration with 'domestic concerns' in the Negotiating Framework with Turkey, which envisages the creation of permanent safeguard clauses in the Accession Treaty, potentially falling short of full membership, 211 and 215; see also Christophe Hillion, 'Negotiating frame Turkey's future relations with the eu (in conjunction with Article 216 or 217 tfeu, if Article 8 teu is found not to constitute an autonomous material legal basis for the procedure along with Article 218 tfeu),145 would be the continued promotion of the Union's value in more flexible terms, while at the same time avoiding 'false hopes' of accession and remaining binding on the Member States.146 However, this would represent a 'downgrading' of Turkey's relations with the Union, arguably to gain flexibility within the conditionality; whereas on the other hand, the Union's values would remain unchanged. In this respect, it has been argued that Article 8 teu 'impedes the Union from entering into special relationship with neighbouring countries refusing to commit themselves to the values of the Union. The same would be the case for countries actively obstructing such a commitment. Finally, the limitation would arguably also apply in an unsatisfactory situation where no signs of improvement are shown over time' .147 Turkey is supposed to have passed that 'entry point' a decade ago but has not subsequently maintained momentum. Under Article 8 teu, it would appear that the point of entry characterising good neighbourliness in the eu legal order also constitutes the foundation against which all neighbouring countries are evaluated, be they associated to the Union or not, and below which none should fall at any time. Moving the legal basis from Article 49 teu to Article 8 teu would have the benefit of providing Turkey with an impetus for a 'fresh' interpretation of the Union's values, potentially beneficial to all parties. This would greatly depend, however, on whether a political decision on the 'renewed' conclusion of the eu-Turkey relations is ultimately achieved, as well as on Turkey's own interpretation of this relationship and values, while other countries such as Ukraine move rapidly towards eu membership.
Conclusion
This chapter has tried to identify and explain first the relevance and then the importance of the good neighbourliness principle in the context of the relations a single Member State can maintain with its neighbours, both from within and outside the eu, no matter how troubled and atypical such relations may be. Through the examination of scenarios found 'on the edge' of the principle, this chapter has shown that good neighbourliness lies at the foundations of the process of European integration and constitutes in all cases a commitment to be met by all, simultaneously delimiting the process's outer application. In particular, it appears that troubled neighbouring bilateral relations can be addressed within the broad framework of eu external relations based on mandatory considerations of good neighbourliness,148 irrespective of whether the neighbouring country/territory is a direct neighbour of the Union itself.149 It also appears that the lack of reciprocity in neighbouring bilateral relations, whether intentional (in the case of Turkey) or not (in the case of the de facto division of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus) appears to enhance the role of the Union in the good neighbourliness process. This does not, however, appear to relieve the Member State and/or the third country concerned from their own commitment to good neighbourliness. Nevertheless, the nature and scope of the commitment may not be what was originally expected, as developed in this chapter. The example of Turkey in particular shows that it is the extent of the neighbouring country's commitment towards good neighbourliness which should determine the outcome of its relations with the eu. Otherwise, the relationship between the eu and the third country concerned risks being exposed to serious problems in the event of a fundamental shift in the associated country's attitude towards the eu, including with respect to a value, trust or a constitutional crisis in that third country, such as has already occurred within the eu.150 It would therefore appear that the underlying question with respect to good neighbourliness relates to the role which Union values play in the European integration process, even from the outside, and the extent to which such values can be enforced through their outer application. As correctly noted by Hillion, '[i]n the neighbourhood, respect for the values of the Union becomes the aim of, rather than the pre-condition for eu engagement' ,151 thus identifying the need for greater intellectual effort and policymaking in this field.
148 The eu appears to be bound ('shall be bound') to develop good relations with its neighbours by virtue of Article 8(1) teu; see Hillion in Petrov and Van Elsuwege (n 3) 16-17. 149 It is clear that the de facto division of the island of Cyprus does not entail the consideration of the occupied areas as a 'neighbour' of the Republic of Cyprus or of the Union, as developed in this chapter. It should be noted, however, that the European Commission's aid programme for the Turkish Cypriot community falls under dg Enlargement, as there is clearly no better place to house it, thereby reinforcing this chapter's conclusions; see <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/tenders/aid-programme-tcc/index_en.htm> last accessed 15 December 2014. 150 See (n 59). 151 Hillion (n 3) 20.
